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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years, a large class of interdisciplinary problems
has been successfully studied with statistical physics meth-
ods. Statistical physics establishes the bridge from micro-
scopic characteristics to macroscopic behaviors, for systems
containing a large number of interacting components. Using
both analytical and numerical tools, it has contributed greatly
to our understanding of various complex systems. In this pa-
per, we are motivated by the statistical physics of a sociologi-
cal problem, namely, opinion dynamics.
As one of the classical and traditional research areas in both
social science and theory physics, opinion dynamics has at-
tracted much attention. A lot of models concerning the pro-
cess of opinion formation, such as voter model, bounded con-
fidence model, have been proposed previously. Meanwhile,
some of recent studies discussed and described the opinion
dynamics on both common conditions and various complex
networks.
The issue of individual mobility has become increasingly
fundamental due to the Human migration and human dy-
namic. The issue is also important in other contexts such
as the emergence of Cooperation among individuals [20] and
species coexistence in cyclic competing games [21]. Recently,
some empirical data of human movements have been collected
and analyzed [22,23]. From the standpoint for dynamic of
complex systems, when individuals (nodes, agents) are mo-
bile, the edges in the topological structures are no longer fixed,
yielding more different results on that than before.
In our paper, we try to propose a new model combining con-
ventional opinion dynamics with agents immigration accord-
ing to information transmission and evolution. In our simu-
lation, we finally find a series of results reflecting special and
different features of opinion dynamics with immigration. By
introducing a parameter α to control the weight of influence
of individual opinions, according to a recent study consider-
ing weight influence, we find that there also exist an optimal
value of α leading to the shortest consensus time for all indi-
viduals on a isotropic plane we concern. After presenting the
results of simulation in different situations, we also analysis
the results of our model in mathematical way, which leads us
finding out what are the exactly direct factors impacting the
exponent of weight of individual opinions.
In this paper we found up a new type of model for infor-
mation dynamics with immigration and we state related pa-
rameters and rules of our model. In order to demonstrate the
rationality of it, we presented both computational simulation
FIG. 1: (Color online) For N = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, the density
ρc as a function of α for different values of r in the case where all
cooperators contribute the same cost c per game. Every cooperator
contributes a cost c = 1 in every neighborhood that it plays.
and mathematical analysis. Another most significant thing is
that we have designed a new mathematical method for model
with linear algebra.Compared with the previous method,we
finally finish a complete model for opinion and information
dynamics with immigration.
II. MODEL
As previous classical model focusing on the material pro-
cess of spread and formation of opinions, we spend more ef-
forts on finding special results when individuals carry opin-
ions with immigration. To focus on a more efficient situation,
we just confine our discussion on an isotropic plane, without
special network effects. On the other hand, the individuals
we concern are just holding two kinds of opinion, the positive
opinion ψ+ > 0 and the negative opinion ψ− < 0. Accord-
ing to one model on opinion dynamics proposed before (.), we
introduce the weight exponent to control the weight of influ-
ence of each individual. We describe that all of the opinions
of individuals evolve simultaneously completely rely on its
neighbors’ opinion and neighbors’ weight. Here we describe
the evolution process of the whole individuals on the plane in
mathematical way, which could be denoted as follow (yang
han xing)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Cumulative payoff distribution for different
values of α. The distribution is obtained after the cooperation density
becomes stable. The multiplication factor is set to be r = 1.6. Solid
curves are theoretical predictions from Eq. (??).
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where p+ and p− denote the probability of choosing pos-
itive opinion and negative opinion,and the number of neigh-
bors holding positive opinion is u while the number of neg-
ative ones is v. Here the model considers the agents with
weight impact ωi, which is controlled by weight exponent α.
If the probability p+ is lager than p−, the agent we concern
will choose positive opinion at the next step. And it will be
same as choosing negative opinion.
In this model, the individual we concern evolves its opin-
ion at t + 1 according to its neighbors’ opinion in its view
radius r, which is shown in Figure.1. In Figure.1, the red
agents hold positive opinions and black agents hold negative
opinions. There are u + v neighbors in the view range of
individual we concern, while here are u individuals hold pos-
itive opinion and v individuals hold negative opinion at t step.
After comparing the weight of positive opinion and negative
opinion, the individual we concern evolves its opinion at t+1
step as this
ψ
(t+1)
i =
∑
r
ψ
(t)
j (3)
where ψ(t)j denotes the opinion state of the jth neighbor of
the ith agent we concern at the t step. After changing their
opinion in the way above, all the individuals immigrate on
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Times series of cooperator density in hubs’
neighborhoods for (a) The multiplication factor is r = 1.2 and each
data point is obtained by averaging over 50 runs.
the plane. All the agents would be confined in the plane by
periodic boundary condition. The velocity and direction an-
gle of each agent are randomly distributed, which are kept by
each agent all the time. After enough period of time, num-
ber of the individuals holding positive opinions N+ and the
number of other individuals holding negative ones N
−
reach
a plateaus and dynamic equilibrium. At that certain point, we
believe that the process of opinion dynamics would be termi-
nated. And we could find that if all of the individuals enter
the plateaus, the total number of individuals who hold posi-
tive opinion at t step ψt+ would be approximately equal to the
number of individuals who also hold that at t + 1 step ψt+1+ .
And we could carry on this description with mathematical lan-
guage,
N∑
i
ψ
(t+1)
i =
N∑
i
ψ
(t)
i (4)
The total time steps the system took could be defined as Tc for
convergent time.
A. Results and analysis
In the following discussion and simulation, we confines our
individuals on an isotropic plane (L × L). The length of the
boundary of this plane L is 20, and the total number of indi-
viduals on the plane would be N . Here we simulate the in-
dividuals have their initial velocity under Gauss distribution,
which would be more rational and close to facts. Each individ-
ual hold their opinions (positive one or negative one) and their
fixed weight of opinion with random probability. The distri-
bution of agents’ weight was established in a random way at
the beginning of evolution. The exponent α in equations (1)
and (2) controls the evolution process. And here we define
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FIG. 4: (Color online) For r = 1.6, cooperator density ρc as a func-
tion of degree for different values of α.
ρ and ∆ρ to describe the changing process of the individuals
holding positive opinion. They are denoted in equations as
follow
ρc =
N+
N
(5)
∆ρ =
∆N+
N
(6)
In Figure 2,we show ρc as function of evolution time t for
different view radius r, both r=1.2 and r=1.5. The most inter-
esting thing we could find in this figure is that when evolution
time t is around 6500, the value of ∆ρ plummets obviously,
which finally reach the level under 0.1. In fact, when changes
of ∆ρ has lower amplitude of variation, it also means that the
individuals holding positive opinion enter the period of dy-
namic equilibrium.
In this situation, we could find the consensus time in Figure
3. If t < 4000 or t > 6500, the ∆ρ changes in a very small
range which would also be shown in the figure. But the con-
sensus time is not directly impacted by only view radius r of
each individual. In Figure 4, here converge time Tc is taken
as a function of average velocity α , while the view radius r is
equal to 1.2. Interestingly, we show that would reach a mini-
mum value when α is around 2 under different values of total
number of individuals on the plane N . Here we present that
consensus time Tc changes with α in a ”smile curve”. And
certainly the value of would be higher if the N is more. In
fact, it is obvious to explain that when there are more individ-
uals holding different opinions, they would take more time to
reach consensus or dynamic equilibrium. In that we show that
N and weight exponent α could both directly determine the
consensus time Tc. The more cogent demonstration is shown
in Figure 2, which presents as a function of α. Here ρc is the
density of individuals holding positive opinions at the consen-
sus time.
0 1 2 3 4
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
 
 
v
Tc
 N=1000
 N=2500
 
 
FIG. 5: (Color online) For r = 1.6, cooperator density ρc as a func-
tion of degree for different values of α.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) (a)[Initial distribution of agents with two kinds
of opinions,N+ :N−=1.19:1. (b)Final distribution of agents with two
kinds of opinions, N+:N−=2.91:1.
In the Figure 2, we present that ρc will reach a maximum
when is around 2. Meanwhile, the value of is greater if view
radius is lager. To show the result in a more intuitive way, we
present the distribution map in Figure 6. In Figure 6, the red
points are the ones holding positive opinions while the black
points present negative ones. In this figure, we present the
specific distribution.
To support former results, we mainly focus on the results
that positive opinions take dominant rate. In order to dis-
cuss the parameters reflecting immigration of individuals, we
present consensus time Tc as a function of average velocity
of individuals with different N in Figure 5. In this figure, we
find that consensus time Tc would increase approximately in
a linear way when v is less than 1.5. After that , it decreases
in a certain range without sharp changes.
To discuss the model in a more reliable way, we try to anal-
ysis the process by founding up a series of equations for m
4agents in total as follow. In equations, we define that the ith
individual we concern has a view radius r, and at the t step
there are sm individuals in its view range as its neighbors,and
here we define that sij as the ith neighbor of the jth agent we
concern. In that, it is jth opinion state of agent’s neighbor at
t step that determine the opinion updating of this individuals
at next time step t+ 1. If ψ is positive, individuals who hold-
ing positive opinions would have greater weight than those
who hold negative opinions. As a consequence, the equations
could be formed as follow:


ψ
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α
sm,m
(7)
To describe the model in a simpler way, we try to apply linear
algebra instead of these traditional equations. In order to write
in that way, we also introduce a new parameter n(t)ij into this
matrix description. Here n(t)ij reflects that the times of opinion
exchanging or sharing of jth individual we concern at t step.
In other word, n(t)ij is a standard that concerns how many times
the ith individual impacts others opinion updating choice of
next time step at t step. When the whole individuals get into
the plateaus of dynamic equilibrium, we discussed in Sec.2,
the opinions individuals holding would be described as where
ω(i) is the weight of the ith agent, which is
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Here we denote that n(t)ij as the times for opinion exchanges
between the ith and jth agents at the t time step. At that cer-
tain situation, we would find that When the whole system has
entered the final homeostasis, the whole opinions of agents
we concern would be invariable, which means that . And we
could finally find that the time of opinion sharing or exchang-
ing is related to the weight of the agent and exponent in the
equation. After simplified such matrix equation, we finally get
a direct function for n(t)ij and α
m∑
j=1
n
(t)
ij ω
α
i = 1 (9)
where ωi is weight of the ith agent we concern.
By choosing five different groups n(t)ij when we fixed α = 2,
we finally calculate the α with the function for support that,
from which we get α = 1.98, 1.93, 1.82, 1.88, 1.91.By the
calculation, the function reflects a very important and simple
relationship between n(t)ij and weight ωi
III. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
The new mode of opinion evolution with immigration is
different from the conventional opinion dynamics. It presents
that density of positive opinion agents would be maximum
when the weight exponent α is around 2. In summary, we
found up a new model for opinion exchange and communi-
cation among agents with immigration. The state matrix we
present for analysis and quantitative simulation could also be
widely used for more complex situation. The opinion carried
by agents represent a kind of state or parameter of agents in
motion.So more application and analysis could be carried on
with this model and method in future. Discussion we present
above is not only to demonstrate our model, but also open up a
new combination between opinion communication and agent-
based motion. State consensus time is also a very important
parameter to describe a system or a group of agents, which
could also be one certain standard for different situations.
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